234 incidents on record · 2026HeadlightsIncident reports by Ellie Harris · Melbourne
5 new this weekLibrary last updated 14 October 2026
← The incident library
HD-INC-205
Welfare and social security · United Kingdom · 2025 · A fraud risk model found by its operator to refer some age groups and non-UK nationals more often, without those referrals proving correct more often, kept in use while a retrained version was tested

The DWP Kept a Fraud Model That Referred Older and Non-UK Claimants More Often

By Ellie Harris · Filed Model in use since May 2022; fairness assessment covering April 2024 to March 2025 published July 2025

Alleged: Department for Work and Pensions developed or deployed the AI system implicated in this incident. Details are drawn from public reports; parties are presumed innocent of any wrongdoing not established by an official finding.

The DWP Kept a Fraud Model That Referred Older and Non-UK Claimants More Often

What happened

The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) reported that it has used a machine learning model since May 2022 to check Universal Credit advance requests for possible fraud. An advance gives someone part of their benefit early, which they repay from later payments. The DWP says the model flags requests it considers high risk. A caseworker then checks the request, and the claimant has to provide more evidence.

In July 2025, the DWP published a fairness assessment covering April 2024 to March 2025. It found that claimants aged 45 and over, and non-UK nationals, were sent for extra checks more often. But those referrals were no more likely, or were less likely, to prove correct.

The DWP wrote that “the model is not working as effectively as we would expect”. It decided to keep using the model while retraining it. The National Audit Office (NAO) set this out in October 2025.

The DWP’s July 2026 assessment reported that the retrained model was still being tested. It also found that non-UK nationals were 3.35 times as likely to be referred as UK nationals, compared with 2.27 a year earlier.

What an auditable version would have shown

The DWP reported these differences in its own assessments. It compared how often the model flagged people in each group with how often a caseworker went on to refuse their advance.

The DWP also reported limits to what it could measure. In 2025, age was the only protected characteristic it could analyse because too few referred claimants answered its equality questions. It looked at nationality separately, without then treating it as a protected characteristic.

In 2026, the DWP analysed both age and nationality, treating nationality as part of race. It did not report separate analyses of disability, sex or ethnicity.

The DWP reported that claimants aged 66 and over were 49.24 times as likely to be referred in 2025. It said this figure should be “treated with caution” because the group made up just 0.1 per cent of the data.

The sources reviewed do not count how many legitimate claimants were referred or refused.

Where the gap was

The DWP had found that its model sent some groups for extra checks more often, without those checks proving correct more often. It said there was “minimal concern” about discrimination, unfair treatment or detrimental impact on claimants. The department kept using the model while testing a retrained version.

A MetricRecord is designed to hold signed aggregate figures, such as referral and correct-referral rates by group, bound to the underlying decisions so they can be checked independently.

A ConductRecord keeps each referral, the caseworker’s decision and the outcome.

MetricRecord and ConductRecord are Headlights designs.

What governance should have looked like

The DWP says the model does not decide whether someone gets an advance. A caseworker makes that decision without being told the model flagged the request. The department reported that people whose advances were approved after extra checks waited a median of one additional day for payment. It also said that someone refused an advance can apply again.

The DWP found the model about three times more effective than random selection in 2025 and 2.5 times in 2026.

In August 2026, the Independent Monitoring Authority for the Citizens’ Rights Agreements, which oversees the rights of EU and EEA EFTA citizens in the UK, said the DWP had assured it that “nationality, or similar, is not a risk factor in the model”. The authority took no further action.

When a public body finds that its model sends some groups for extra checks more often without those checks proving correct more often, best practice would be to set a deadline for improving it. The body should publish how it will measure the results and report whether the differences between groups have narrowed.

Failure Pattern: the DWP’s own analysis found its fraud model referred older and non-UK claimants for extra checks more often, without those referrals proving correct more often, and the department kept using it while a retrained model was tested.

Governance Principle: a public body using a risk model should be able to show, by group, how often the model refers people, how often those referrals prove correct, and what it did when the two diverged.

The reference implementation of MetricRecord and ConductRecord is open source. It lives at github.com/saffronandindia/headlights-oss, Apache 2.0 licensed and free to install. The repository is public now.

Sources

The mailing list

Fresh incident reports every week. One email to match.

We add new incidents to the library regularly, and send a single short email each week with what's new. The library stays free and open; this is just how you keep up with it.

Sent through Substack. Unsubscribe in one click.

The record

An auditable system would have produced a signed, tamper-evident record the moment this happened: what the system did, the version that did it, the basis it acted on, and the action taken, and Department for Work and Pensions could have produced it on demand.

This is the record the system as deployed did not produce in a signed, auditable form.

What this teaches
Capture what happened when it happens
What the system did, the version that did it, the basis it acted on, and the action taken, recorded at the moment, not reconstructed after.
Sign it, so no one has to trust the record-keeper
A tamper-evident entry. Edit it later and the signature breaks. The record does not ask for the benefit of the doubt.
Make it verifiable by anyone
A court, a regulator, a customer's lawyer can check the record themselves, without taking the company, or us, at our word.

Headlights summarises publicly reported AI incidents. All summaries are independently written, attributed to their original sources, and intended for research and educational purposes. Allegations are identified as such until established through official findings.

Last reviewed September 2026. This report is based on the sources listed above and reflects information available at the time of review; later developments may not be captured. Where a person is described as charged with or alleged to have done something, that allegation is unproven unless a conviction or a court or regulatory finding is stated. Headlights publishes journalism and commentary, not legal advice.

Want to write back?

Direct to my inbox.

ellie@useheadlights.com →