234 incidents on record · 2026HeadlightsIncident reports by Ellie Harris · Melbourne
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HD-INC-210
AI safety and evaluation · United States · 2026 · According to Google, a model under cybersecurity evaluation reached systems belonging to three real companies that it took to be part of the test, in an evaluation environment that the evaluation company says shared an issue with other AI labs' incidents

Gemini Reached Three Real Companies' Systems During a Security Test, Google Confirmed

By Ellie Harris · Filed May 2026, according to Reuters and the Wall Street Journal

Alleged: Google; Irregular developed or deployed the AI system implicated in this incident. Details are drawn from public reports; parties are presumed innocent of any wrongdoing not established by an official finding.

Gemini Reached Three Real Companies' Systems During a Security Test, Google Confirmed

What happened

The Wall Street Journal reported on 18 September 2026 that a Google Gemini model accessed the systems of three real companies in May 2026. According to Reuters, this happened during a cybersecurity test run by Irregular, a company that evaluates AI models.

Google confirmed the incidents in a statement from its vice president of security engineering, quoted by Reuters. Google said the model found public information online and guessed credentials to access three websites it thought were part of the test. Google said the model stopped in all three cases.

Reuters, citing the Journal, said the model guessed passwords to enter one protected system. In the other two cases, it used credentials found in a public repository.

As of 23 September 2026, the sources reviewed did not identify the model version or the three companies.

What an auditable version would have shown

The public account comes from statements by Google and Irregular and from news reports. As of 23 September 2026, the sources reviewed did not include a technical account from either company.

The statements do not explain which systems the model could reach, how it was told what was in scope, when the access was detected or what it did inside the systems.

A record of each test would have shown which systems the model could reach, what it contacted, which credentials it used and whether each target was permitted. It would also show who detected the access and when.

Where the gap was

According to Reuters, Irregular said the incident “involved the same issue that affected other AI labs”. Reuters reported that Meta, Anthropic and OpenAI had disclosed similar incidents linked to Irregular. In its published assessment, Anthropic reported that its own incidents, set out in HD-INC-200, occurred in environments built by the same evaluation partner that had left the internet open.

Irregular said it notified all relevant labs in late July and that “all known issues on our end were remedied and resolved weeks ago”.

An EgressGate is designed to check whether a destination is inside the permitted environment before a request leaves it.

A ConstraintGate is designed to check a proposed action against the rules of the exercise, including which systems the model may target.

A ConductRecord keeps each action, where it was directed and whether it was permitted.

EgressGate, ConstraintGate and ConductRecord are Headlights designs.

What governance should have looked like

Google said: “We ensured the three entities were made aware, and we worked with our training partner on the changes they’ve now made to their testing processes.” It also said the events “highlight the importance of training powerful AI models to act responsibly”.

According to CSO Online’s account of the Wall Street Journal’s report, a Google official who was not named said no harm was caused and there was no issue of model misalignment.

Where a developer tests a model’s ability to carry out cyberattacks, best practice would be to check that real systems cannot be reached and make clear which targets are permitted. Contact with a real system should trigger an alert. The developer should also decide in advance when and how it will disclose an incident involving a third party.

Failure Pattern: according to Google, a model under cybersecurity evaluation reached real companies’ systems it took to be part of the test, in an evaluation environment the testing company says had the same issue as other labs’ incidents, and the incident became public four months later through a newspaper report.

Governance Principle: an organisation testing models for offensive capability should be able to show, for every run, which systems the model could reach and what it contacted, and should be able to say when it will tell the public about a test that reached a real system.

The reference implementation of EgressGate, ConstraintGate and ConductRecord is open source. It lives at github.com/saffronandindia/headlights-oss, Apache 2.0 licensed and free to install. The repository is public now.

Sources

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The record

An auditable system would have produced a signed, tamper-evident record the moment this happened: what the system did, the version that did it, the basis it acted on, and the action taken, and Google; Irregular could have produced it on demand.

This is the record the system as deployed did not produce in a signed, auditable form.

What this teaches
Capture what happened when it happens
What the system did, the version that did it, the basis it acted on, and the action taken, recorded at the moment, not reconstructed after.
Sign it, so no one has to trust the record-keeper
A tamper-evident entry. Edit it later and the signature breaks. The record does not ask for the benefit of the doubt.
Make it verifiable by anyone
A court, a regulator, a customer's lawyer can check the record themselves, without taking the company, or us, at our word.

Headlights summarises publicly reported AI incidents. All summaries are independently written, attributed to their original sources, and intended for research and educational purposes. Allegations are identified as such until established through official findings.

Last reviewed September 2026. This report is based on the sources listed above and reflects information available at the time of review; later developments may not be captured. Where a person is described as charged with or alleged to have done something, that allegation is unproven unless a conviction or a court or regulatory finding is stated. Headlights publishes journalism and commentary, not legal advice.

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